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Abstract
We analyzed the effects of ownership structure, capital structure and growth 
opportunities on stock price reactions when companies issued debt or equity. 
Our results, based on event study methodology and IV regressions from a 
sample of 70 Chilean firms, indicate that controlling shareholder ownership 
has a negative effect on stock price reactions for debt issuances and a positive 
effect for equity issuance. These results indicate that debt issuances are a 
substitute for majority shareholder monitoring, and that equity issuances are 
associated with superior corporate performance. Equity issuances are a means 
for expropriating wealth from non-controlling shareholders. Debt and growth 
opportunities have a non-linear effect. 
 
Resumen
En este artículo analizamos los efectos de la estructura de propiedad, estructura 
de capital y las oportunidades de crecimiento sobre la reacción del precio de 
las acciones cuando las empresas emiten deuda o capital. Nuestros resultados, 
basados en la metodología de análisis de eventos y regresiones IV sobre una 
muestra de 70 empresas chilenas, indican que la propiedad de los accionistas 
controladores tiene un efecto negativo en la reacción del precio de las acciones 
cuando las empresas emiten deuda y positivo cuando emiten acciones. Este 
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resultado indica que las emisiones de deuda son un sustituto del control mayoritario de los accionistas 
y las emisiones de capital se asocian con un mayor desempeño corporativo. Las emisiones de capital 
son un medio para expropiar riqueza de los accionistas no controladores. Las oportunidades de 
deuda y crecimiento tienen un efecto no lineal.
 
1. Introduction
Capital structure decisions have been widely researched in recent decades. Many researchers have 
focused  their attention on the relationship between information asymmetry and stock price reactions 
to changes in firms’ capital structure , due to the  possible effects of this relationship on shareholder 
wealth. In general, stock price reactions are associated with abnormal  negative returns during 
security issuance periods, and positive returns during preceding periods (Asquith and Mullins, 1986; 
Mikkelson and Partch, 1986; Mitto, 1996; Welch, 2004; Vithessonthi, 2008a). 
According to Masulis (1980), it is possible for controlling shareholders to expropriate wealth from 
minority shareholders through capital structure changes. This would depend on the firm’s ownership 
structure, and especially on the participation of controlling and minority shareholders (Armitage, 2002, 
2010; Liu et al., 2016). For the Chilean market, it is relevant to analyze this empirical relationship as 
Chile has weak investor protections, while firm ownership is highly concentrated among controlling 
shareholders. As a result, this favors wealth redistribution away from minority shareholders through 
capital structure changes.
Market reactions and potential shareholder wealth changes can depend on other characteristics 
of the business, such as debt (Ross, 1977; Leland and Pyle, 1977) and growth opportunities (Myers, 
1977; Myers and Majluf, 1984). However, there is no clear consensus on their effects on stock price 
reactions. For example, some studies have indicated that stock prices react positively to debt issuance 
mainly in firms with low leverage (Cai and Zhang, 2011). This reaction implies that markets associate 
debt issuance as a means of control over the principal agent problem (Harris and Raviv, 1990). Other 
studies provide a different view and document a negative reaction (Diekerns, 1991). This market 
response indicates that higher debt may increase firms’ bankruptcy risk (Raymar, 1993). Regarding 
growth  opportunities, empirical studies have demonstrated that their effects on stock prices depend 
on their valuation (Smith and Watts, 1992; Quynh-Nhu, 2009). The lack of consensus on market 
interpretations could be explained by the non-linear effect of these factors on stock price reactions. 
For the Chilean market, these relationships are still unanswered questions and their implications are 
relevant for firms’ corporate governance and investors, especially when inferring  the possible market 
reaction to capital structure changes and how it may alter shareholders’ wealth.
This paper analyzes the effect of ownership structure, growth opportunities and leverage on stock 
price reactions associated with capital structure changes in Chilean companies. Our research contributes 
to the empirical literature in two aspects. First, it quantifies stock price reactions to capital structure 
changes. These reactions measure changes in shareholder wealth. Second, it analyzes the impacts of 
ownership structure and the possible non-monotonous effects of debt and growth opportunities on 
shareholder wealth. This is relevant for investors and firms because it reveals that the stock market 
interprets these qualities in different ways during capital structure change processes. 
We used a sample of 70 companies listed on the Santiago Stock Exchange. We studied 172 
announcements of equity issuances and 319 announcements of corporate bond issuances. The results 
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showed that debt and equity issuances generated positive stock prices reactions, and therefore 
positive effects on shareholder wealth. The figures indicate an abnormal return of 2.43% and 0.92% 
associated with debt and equity issuances respectively. Controlling-shareholder ownership has a 
negative effect on stock market reactions for debt and a positive effect on equity issuances. This 
suggests that the stock market responds positively to controlling shareholder ownership, associating 
it with tighter corporate control and firm performance. Minority shareholder ownership negatively 
affects stock market reactions only in the case of equity issuances, which indicates a possibility for 
wealth expropriation from these investors. Finally, debt and growth opportunities have non-linear 
effects on stock market reaction. This supports the finding that the stock  market interprets these 
qualities in different ways during capital structure adjustments.
This paper is organized as follows. After this introduction, section 2 presents the theoretical 
framework for stock price reactions to capital structure changes, and its determining factors. This 
section also includes the research hypothesis. Section 3 presents the data and methodologies used, 
while section 4 shows the results. Finally, section 5 indicates the main conclusions of this article.
2. Theoretical framework and hypothesis
2.1. Background on stock price reaction and shareholder wealth
Capital structure has been widely researched, starting with the seminal works proposed by Modigliani 
and Miller (1958, 1963). Various theories have tried to explain how stock prices react to firms’ capital 
structure adjustments, and which factors explain that reaction. 
Asymmetric information theory has provided important answers. Financing security issuances 
can be associated with  an adverse selection problem, which would explain stock price reactions. 
Myers and Majluf (1984) have found  that equity contains higher information asymmetry, encouraging 
managers to issue overvalued equity. Even when managers are aligned with shareholder interests, 
the incentive to underinvest transmits negative information about the company that can be related 
to negative stock price reactions at the moment of announcement/issuance . Ross (1977), and Leland 
and Pyle (1977) add that managers use capital structure as a false signaling mechanism regarding the 
firm’s quality. This moral risk problem associates positive abnormal stock returns with firms whose 
performance has been exaggerated , while negative abnormal returns are related to undervalued 
firms. However, uncertainty is reduced during issuance, generating a negative reaction in stock 
prices for overvalued firms.
Several studies have highlighted the downward adjustments of abnormal returns at the moment 
of issuance. Asquith and Mullins (1986) analyzed 266 equity issuances between 1963 and 1981 and 
found that stock prices experience negative abnormal returns of 2.7% during issuance. Lucas and 
McDonald (1990) corroborated this result, although they also documented positive abnormal returns 
prior to issuance. The authors note a positive correlation between information asymmetry reduction 
and stock price increases prior to issuance. They even warn that if abnormal returns are higher prior 
to announcement, the decreases during the issuance period will be less severe, thereby encouraging 
companies to issue equity. Mikkelson and Partch (1986) conducted an empirical study for 360 US 
companies, corresponding to 595 announcement events. Their results supported  Asquith and Mullins 
(1986) and Masulis and Korwar (1986), which showed that stock price reactions were positive during 
periods preceding announcements and issuances, and negative at the moment of announcement and 
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issuance . Other international studies have corroborated these findings for developed markets (Healy 
and Palepu, 1990; Eckbo and Masulis, 1992; Mitto, 1996; Burton et al., 2000; Welch, 2004; Barnes and 
Walker, 2006) as well as emerging markets (Leal and Amaral, 2000; De Medeiros and Matsumoto, 2005; 
Vithessonthi, 2008a, 2008b, 2008c; Chen and Shehu, 2009; Liu et al., 2016). Furthermore, these papers 
have documented that abnormal returns decrease more for equity issuances than for debt issuances.
In Chile, such evidence is scarce. Saens (1999) analyzed ADRs of Chilean companies on the NYSE 
and found positive abnormal returns. At the local level, Castillo (2004) analyzed 172 bond and equity 
issuances for the period 1993-2002. The results indicated that bond issuances do not generate 
significant stock price reactions, while equity issuances cause negative abnormal returns. However, 
the analysis does not reveal the factors that explain these reactions. According to the empirical 
literature, we expect that capital structure adjustments generate significant shareholder wealth 
changes. Therefore, we proposed this hypothesis:
H1: Corporate debt and equity issuances generate changes in shareholder wealth.
2.2. Stock price reactions and ownership structure 
International studies have shown  that the announcements and issuances of debt or equity can have 
significant impacts on stock prices. This process has the potential to become a means of wealth 
expropriation from minority shareholders to majority shareholders (Masulis, 1980). 
Firms’ ownership structures can be related to stock price reactions, and therefore to changes in 
shareholder wealth . Market perceptions of  investors who buy the issued stocks would be relevant to 
stock price reactions. Barnes and Walker (2006) analyzed UK firms and showed that equity issuances 
generated both positive and negative abnormal returns. Positive reactions are concentrated in equity 
issuances, especially if shareholders also bought these securities. Armitage (2002) corroborated 
this result and added that UK companies have less concentrated ownership structures,  leading to 
a favorable market reaction when shareholders then bought a greater proportion of issued stocks. 
Stock markets positively correlate firm performance with higher shareholder participation (Leland 
and Pyle, 1977). Armitage (2010) adds that the UK market has an institutional context that promotes 
investor protections. This context associates a positive stock price reaction with majority and minority 
shareholder ownership, inhibiting opportunities for wealth redistribution. 
Emerging markets have different features. Weak legal protection for investors’ rights and higher 
ownership concentration are some qualities that favor wealth expropriation. Vithessonthi (2008a, 
2008b) and Liu et al. (2016) indicate that, for Thai and Chinese markets, respectively, equity issuances 
generate a positive reaction only if controlling shareholders buy these stocks. However, if minority 
shareholders buy securities, the stock price reaction is negative. This result may be associated with 
the pessimistic market perceptions surrounding conflicts of interest between controlling and minority 
shareholders. Chile has similar conditions to emerging markets, but there is no evidence regarding 
this relationship. Therefore, we propose these hypotheses:
H2a: Controlling-shareholder ownership has a positive effect on stock price reactions for equity issuances.
H2b: Minority-shareholder ownership has a negative effect on stock price reactions for equity issuances.
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Empirical evidence has demonstrated that shareholder wealth increases when firms issue 
corporate debt (Mikkelson and Partch, 1986; Eckbo and Masulis, 1992; Burton et al., 2000). Normally 
stock price reactions to corporate debt issuances are greater than the reactions experienced during 
equity issuances. This market reaction implies that issued debt represents a means for external 
monitoring on corporate governance. Myers and Majluf (1984) add that debt issuances generate 
more positive stock price reactions because they reduce  incentives to underinvest. In the context 
of information asymmetry, this effect indicates that issued debt constitutes a means of control over 
managerial discretion and agency conflicts (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; 
Jensen, 1986). For this reason, corporate debt is a substitute means of control in relation to ownership 
concentration. During debt issuances, this fact generates a stock price reaction negatively related to 
controlling-shareholder ownership (Chong and López de Silanes, 2007). On the other hand, Céspedes 
et al. (2010) have replicated  these results in Latin American countries, and added that debt is positively 
associated with minority shareholder ownership. In this case, debt is considered as a means of  control 
that complements the monitoring role of minority shareholders and alleviates wealth expropriation 
and agency problems. As a result, stock price reactions to debt issuances can be positively related to 
minority-shareholder ownership. In Chile, this subject has not yet been analyzed and its implications 
are relevant for firms’ corporate governance. Therefore, we formulate these hypotheses:
H3a: Controlling-shareholder ownership has a negative effect on stock price reactions for debt issuances.
H3b: Minority-shareholder ownership has a positive effect on stock price reactions for debt issuances.
2.3. Role of growth opportunities and debt level
Bayless and Chaplinsky (1996) have argued that debt or equity issuances and stock price reactions 
to these processes may depend on firm characteristics, such as growth opportunities (Myers and 
Majluf, 1984) and debt level (Ross, 1977).
Regarding growth opportunities, Chung et al. (1998) note that the quality of firm investment 
sets could determine stock price reactions to capital structure changes, although there is no clear 
consensus on this effect. Some international studies have documented that growth opportunities 
increase shareholder wealth. This is due to the fact that the market perceives that these opportunities 
are undervalued or valued enough to offset the information asymmetry cost (Dierkens, 1991; Pilotte, 
1992; Denis, 1994; Burton et al., 2000; Quynh-Nhu, 2009). Thus, as growth opportunities increase, 
stock prices experience positive abnormal returns during debt or equity issuances. Myers and Majluf 
(1984), Ambarish et al. (1987) and Cooney and Kalay (1993) add that if not, stock prices will react 
positively only to debt issuances, while reactions to equity issuances may be negative.
Other studies have taken a different point of view. McLaughlin et al. (1998), Smith and Watts (1992), 
and Gombola et al. (1998) found that growth opportunities negatively affect stock price reactions. 
These authors support the view that markets associate greater growth opportunities with overvalued 
firms and higher information asymmetries (Jensen et al., 1994). In fact, Smith and Watts (1992) add 
that market responses are more negative for firms with greater growth opportunities than for those 
experiencing  low levels of growth. This lack of consensus can be explained through the non-linear 
effect of growth opportunities on stock price reactions. This relationship might separate the negative 
perception associated with overvalued firms from the positive reaction linked to undervalued growth 
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opportunities (Denis, 1994). In Chile, this phenomenon has not yet been studied, and it also is relevant 
for corporate financing decisions. We therefore formulated this hypothesis:
H4: Growth opportunities have a non-linear effect on stock price reactions during debt and equity issuances.
Empirical evidence indicates that stock price reactions are also  affected by levels of corporate 
debt. Diekerns (1991) and Raymar (1993) found  that stock price reactions during equity issuances 
are  positively affected by leverage. This relationship is observed mainly in firms with high debt levels. 
In this case, the market perceives that equity issuances are associated with information asymmetry 
reduction and bankruptcy risk mitigation. In this same scenario, debt issuances may generate negative 
stock price reactions as the stock market perceives that marginal debt increases bankruptcy risk 
(Raymar, 1993). 
However, Quynh-Nhu (2009) found that debt levels have a negative effect on stock price reactions 
during equity issuances,  and argued that equity has higher information asymmetry in comparison 
to other financing sources. In addition, Cai and Zhang (2011) support the view that stock prices react 
positively to leverage during debt issuances because debt controls agency conflicts. According to these 
findings, the firm’s leverage has a non-linear effect on stock price reactions during debt or equity 
issuances. This kind of relationship would separate the market's  perception of higher information 
asymmetry during equity issuances on the one hand, and agency cost control and bankruptcy risks 
associated with debt issuances on the other. We proposed the following hypothesis:
H5: Debt has a non-linear effect on stock price reactions during debt and equity issuances. 
3. Data and Methods
3.1. Data
The data covers the period between January 1990 and December 2013, and was obtained from two 
sources. Information on daily stock prices, quarterly financial statements and market data was 
extracted from the Economatica® database, while information related to corporate bond issuances 
was obtained from the Financial Markets Commission of Chile (FMC).
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Table 1. Variables
Variables Definition
A. Shareholders wealth changes
AR Abnormal Returns Residuals obtained from the market model
AAR Average Abnormal Returns AR average from each analysis window
CAR Cumulative average abnormal returns AAR accumulated of each analysis window
B. Ownership structure
P1 Controlling-shareholder ownership Percentage of shares of the first shareholder
P5 Minority-shareholder ownership Percentage of shares of the fifth shareholder
C. Leverage and growth opportunities
GOQ Tobin’s Q Asset market value to asset book value ratio
LEV Leverage Debt to total assets ratio
D. Others control variables
AC Agency costs Assets turnover ratio
FD Financial deficit Financial needs according to source-funding identity
SIZE Firm size Natural logarithm of total assets
ROA Firm profitability Return on assets
TANG Asset tangibility Long-term assets to total assets ratio
BIS Bond issue Natural logarithm of the bond issues in billions (pesos)
EIS Equity issue Natural logarithm of the equity issue in billions (pesos)
SLIQ Stock liquidity Quoted spread ratio
 
Source: Own elaboration.
The original sample is composed of 183 open-equity companies with business activity to December 
31, 2013. These firms have a market presence equal to or greater than 70% over the time period, or 
since the company went public. In addition, we have chosen firms that have a presence of greater than 
80% during the time interval of issuance processes or public offerings. Therefore, the final sample 
corresponds to 70 companies. Table 1 details the variables used in this study.
Cumulative abnormal return (CAR) is the dependent variable that measures stock market reactions 
and, therefore, shareholder wealth changes. This measure has been widely used in research based 
on event studies (Brown and Warner, 1985; Mikkelson and Partch, 1986; Corrado, 1989).
We used ownership structure, growth opportunities, debt, agency costs, firm size, firm profitability, 
asset tangibility, financial deficit, issuance size and stock liquidity as control variables.
Ownership structure was measured through the ownership of the first (P1) and fifth (P5) largest 
shareholders. According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), ownership structure can generate shareholder 
wealth changes as well as wealth expropriation. This topic is relevant to the Chilean market because 
minority investor protection is weak and ownership structures are concentrated. These conditions 
facilitate wealth expropriation.
Growth opportunities (GO) were measured through Tobin’s Q. This variable allows control over the 
future growth prospects of the firm associated with financing instrument issuances (Myers, 1977; 
Myers and Majluf, 1984; Cooney and Kalay, 1993; Denis, 1994).
PP 79 | 98Stock price reactions to capital structure changes in Chilean firms:  
Examining the effects of ownership structure, growth opportunities and leverage
Ecos de Economía: A Latin American Journal of Applied Economics | Vol. 23 | No. 49 | 2019
Capital structure (LEV) was measured through the debt to total assets ratio. This measure was 
used by Quynh-Nhu (2009) to quantify market reactions to capital structure changes according to 
corporate debt levels.
Agency costs (AC) were measured by the asset turnover ratio. Jensen (1986), Ang et al. (2000) and 
Fleming et al. (2005) argue that this measurement is an inverse indicator of agency costs because 
firms with higher agency costs are less efficient in using their assets.
Financial deficit (FD) was measured based on source-funding identity. In other words, the sum 
of cash flows committed to dividend payments, working capital changes and capital expenses, minus 
operational flow. Myers and Majluf (1984) state  that this variable is useful to quantify information 
asymmetries in stock price reactions during debt or equity issuances.
Following Rajan and Zingales (1995), we included other control variables such as firm size (SIZE), 
firm profitability (ROA) and asset tangibility (TANG). In addition, Castillo (2004) proposes controlling 
Chilean markets by issue size (IS). Finally, we used the stock liquidity (SLIQ) as a control variable due to 
it being a relevant factor in equity issuance (Lipson and Mortal, 2009).
3.2. Event study methodology and econometric model
The analysis uses two methodologies. First, we used the events study methodology to quantify the 
stock market reaction to the issuance announcements of corporate bonds and equity. Second, we 
used an econometric model to determine the factors that explain the stock market reaction.
Figure 1 shows the stages of the events study methodology. The analysis window has a median 
extension of 161 days for equity issuances and 157 days for corporate bond issuances. Our results 
also indicate that corporate bonds are issued in 46 days on average from their registration and  31 
days in median, while equities are issued in 44 days on average and 35 days in median.
Figure 1 shows that window analysis is divided in five stages. The first stage corresponds to 
the pre-announcement  period, which consists of an80-day period between t=-90 to t=-10. The 
potential stock price reaction at this stage could reveal whether the stock market is receiving relevant 
information from firms or from any other specific agent. However, we expect this reaction to be 
null as Chilean Stock Market Laws prevent companies from disclosing information about securities 
issuance processes before registration.
The second stage corresponds to announcement, which is defined as t=0. According to Castillo 
(2004), this period ranges from t=-10 to t=+10. The announcement is defined as a securities issuance 
approval by the FMC. Chilean stock market regulations only allow firms to announce or disclose 
information regarding such processes once they have been registered and authorized by the FMC.
The third stage is the post-announcement period, which differs according to the kind of security 
issued. The fourth stage corresponds to the issuance period, which ranges from t=+30 to t=+40 for 
equity issuances, and t=+26 to t=+36 for bond issuances. Finally, the analysis window concludes 
with the post-issuance period.
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Figure 1. Temporary analysis window for issuances
Source: Own elaboration.
In accordance with Mikkelson and Partch (1986) and MacKinlay (1997), we measured stock price 
reactions to capital structure changes for each stage. The market model was used to determine this 
reaction on shareholder wealth change. The expected return of security i is:
(1)
Where rmt is daily market returns measured by the General Stock Price Index (IGPA), while ß0 and 
ß1 are the OLS coefficients. The market reaction is measured as:
(2)
Where ARit is the daily abnormal return of security i in period t, rit is the effective return of security 
i in period t and E(rit) is the expected return of security i in period t based on the market model. Thus, 
abnormal returns correspond to market model residuals: 
(3)
Where AARit is the average abnormal return of firm i in period t and T is the size of each stage. 
Finally, we calculated this accumulated measure:
(4)
Where CARit is the cumulative average abnormal return of firm i in period t. These measures were 
applied both to debt and equity issuance announcements. 
Following Corrado (1989), Corrado and Zivney (1992) and Brown and Warner (1985), we used a 
traditional t-student test to determine the statistical significance for AARs. However, the significance 
of CARs was measured through this test:
Pre - announcement Post - announcement 
Announcement Issue
35 days for stocks
31 days for bonds 
-10-90 +10
-5 +5
Post - Issue 
E (rit) = β0 + β1rmt
AR it = rit - E (rit)
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(5)
Where V(AAR) is the variance of AAR and CARL is the cumulative average of the abnormal return 
of window L. This statistic was used to measure the significance of CARs across different windows, 
especially if they showed different behavior. In both cases, the null hypothesis indicates that both 
AAR and CAR are equal to zero, which shows that there are no significant shareholder wealth changes.
Finally, we applied instrumental variable (IV) regression to each stage and to the full process. 
From this regression, we focused on the effects of ownership structure, capital structure and growth 
opportunities on stock price reactions. The empirical model is: 
(6)
Where CARis is the CAR associated with issuances developed by firm i in stage s. This measure 
was calculated in order to obtain one observation per stage during the event and another for the 
whole process. Each observation was matched with quarterly data for issuing firms in order to 
estimate regression (6). Within the control variables, P1 is controller-shareholder ownership, P5 
is minority-shareholder ownership, GO represents the growth opportunities measured by Tobin’s 
Q, LEV is the firm’s capital structure, AC represents agency costs, FD is the financial deficit, SIZE 
indicates  firm size, ROA measures firm profitability, TANG is asset tangibility, IS is issuance size and 
SLIQ represents the stock liquidity. Note that GO2 and LEV2 measure the potential non-linear effect of 
growth opportunities and debt level on stock price reactions, respectively. We used robust variances 
to correct for heteroskedasticity patterns. In addition, dummy variables were included to control the 
differences across economic sectors (DSector), respective emission trimester (DTime) and stage of 
analysis (DStage). The IV estimator was used due to the endogeneity problem between stock market 
reaction, measured through CARis, and issuance size. According to Myers and Majluf (1984) and Baker 
and Wurgler (2002), the equity (debt) issuance depends on stock prices, in this case on CAR. To 
correct this endogeneity problem we used the financial expense ratio, defined as operational income 
to financial expense ratio, and current liquidity, expressed as current assets to current liability ratio. 
These instruments are correlated with issuance size, but not with CAR. Finally, we used the Sargan 
test to evaluate the instrumental overidentification of the models. 
4. Empirical results
4.1.Statistical analysis of debt and equity issuances in Chile
Table 2 presents information on corporate bond issuances registered by firms between 1990 and 
2013. The total number of events associated with debt issuances corresponds to 319 authorized, 
issued and completed records. Bonds denominated in Unidad de Fomento (hereafter referred to as 
U.F.) represent 91.90% of corporate bond issuances in Chile, followed by issuances denominated in 
US dollars (5.33%) and Chilean pesos (3.76%). During the nineties, most issuances were denominated 
in U.F. due to the high inflation rates that characterized this period. Issuances denominated in pesos 
tCAR = CARLT * V (AAR)
CARis = β0 + β1P1is + β2P5is + β3GOis + β4GOis
2 + β5LEVis + β6LEVis
2
+ β7ACis + β8FDis + β9SIZEis + β10ROAis + β11TANGis + β12ISis
+ β13SLIQis + δ0DSectori + δ1DTime + δ2DStage +εis
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became recurrent during periods of lower inflation. This context is associated with the reduction in 
U.F. bond rates from 6.93% in the late 1990s to 3.97% in 2013.
On average, corporate bond maturity was 10.36 years. Debt denominated in U.F. had an average 
maturity of 15.90 years, while issuances denominated in dollars and pesos do not exceed 10 years. 
Corporate bond issuances had specific motivations. 55.49% of bond issuances were made to replace 
existing liabilities and 30.72% were made to finance new investments. Substitutions for foreign 
currency liabilities (6.27%) and short/medium-term liabilities (5.64%) were less common motivations. 
Finally, we did not observe a clear pattern regarding the volume and number of bond issuances.









Reason for issuance Total
IssuesSSM GP FI OF SLF LR
1990 U.F. 4950 6.84 16.40 4 0 1 0 0 0 5
1991 U.F. 7175 6.50 14.25 2 0 2 0 4 0 8
1992 U.F. 1950 6.25 17.00 1 0 1 0 0 0 2
1993  - - - - - - - - - - -
1994 U.F. 5300 6.17 13.33 2 0 4 0 0 0 6
1995  - - - - - - - - - - -
1996  - - - - - - - - - - -
1997 US$ ND 6.00 9.00 0 0 0 6 0 0 6
1998 U.F. 2200 6.75 16.50 0 0 2 0 0 0 2
1999
US$ (*) 100000 Libor+1.5 6 0 0 0 0 0 2 2
U.F. 18500 6.93 22.29 0 0 5 0 0 2 7
2000 U.F. 22056 7.15 16.94 2 0 4 5 0 6 17
2001
U.F. 36830 6.18 12.56 3 0 4 2 0 7 16
US$ 100000 8.00 5.00 0 0 0 0 0 3 3
2002 U.F. 44608 5.86 15.76 4 0 0 0 0 4 8
2003 U.F. 61300 5.08 12.25 0 0 2 0 0 12 14
2004 U.F 24650 4.41 15.56 0 0 0 0 0 7 7
2005 U.F. 85250 3.56 15.29 0 0 4 0 0 22 26
2006 U.F 49600 3.92 18.46 0 0 0 2 0 10 12
2007
U.F 76800 3.55 15.53 0 0 7 3 0 10 20
US$ 600000  20.00 0 0 2 0 0 0 2
2008
U.F 149300 4.01 16.34 0 0 20 2 0 15 37
US$ (*) 565680 Libor +2.53 8.33 0 0 2 0 0 1 3
$ 74800000 7.50 5.00 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
2009
U.F. 138500 4.11 14.93 0 0 14 0 0 18 32
US$ 196000 8.00 10.00 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
$ 383740000 6.40 5.40 0 0 3 0 0 2 5
2010
$ 106030000 7.13 5.00 0 0 0 0 0 2 2
U.F. 43000 5.92 15.80 0 0 5 0 0 10 15
2011 U.F. 41800 3.74 15.73 0 0 7 0 0 8 15
2012
U.F. 99050 4.02 18.12 0 0 7 0 0 19 26
$ 101200000 6.50 6.00 0 0 1 0 0 1 2
2013
U.F. 30300 3.97 15.07 0 2 0 0 0 13 15
$ 96300000 6.50 6.00 0 0 0 0 0 2 2
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Reason for issuance Total
IssuesSSM GP FI OF SLF LR
1990-
2013
U.F 47156 5.25 15.90 18 2 89 14 4 163 290
US$ 312336 7.33 9.72 0 0 5 6 0 6 17
$ 152414000 6.81 5.48 0 0 4 0 0 8 12
 
(*) It includes corrections for issuances at the Libor rate of 180 days. (N/A) indicates information not available. (**) Issuances proposed: 
substitution of short-medium term liabilities (SSM), general purposes (GP), financing investment (FI), company-owned financing (OF), 
substitution of local currency and foreign liabilities (SLF) and liability replacement (LR). Source: own elaboration
Table 3 shows the equity issuances summary across 172 events. Equity issuances fluctuated 
between 0.77% and 284.65% of firms’ capital, with an average of 54.61%. Regardless of the number 
of stocks issued, there was no clearly defined pattern in issuance size. However, the largest number 
of issuances was concentrated in the periods 1997-1998 and 2008-2009, which coincided with the 
Asian and Subprime crises respectively. It should be noted that 73.62% of the issuances were issued 
by manufacturing firms, followed by real estate, banking and financial service sector firms.
Table 3. Equity issuances in Chile, 1990-2013
Years Issued capital (M$) Factor Stocks subscribed (Thousands) Amount (M$) Total Issue
1990 - - - - 0
1991 6.961.962 0,0077 53.263 1.288.969 1
1992 1.317.005 0,1197 131.703 79.156.498 5
1993 7.081.055 0,2467 963.497 279.241.022 9
1994 15.610.423 0,1896 954.192 159.878.113 4
1995 19.610.936 0,2513 4.525.975 359.514.639 14
1996 27.268.990 2,8465 25.245.676 133.944.627.888 9
1997 22.255.806 0,1966 4.336.872 529.058.991 11
1998 2.619.395 0,2407 529.153 249.582.203 9
1999 22.911.895 0,3618 5.412.243 304.612.240 11
2000 28.914.569 0,3635 7.645.426 678.063.590 7
2001 8.843.029 0,1396 821.778 48.239.850 2
2002 9.812.098 2,1460 3.346.883 88.148.863 3
2003 39.904.270 2,6301 32.130.491 1.853.215.351 5
2004 15.110.738 0,2201 2.838.219 490.423.690 7
2005 37.353.382 0,2755 4.931.481 762.795.945 7
2006 2.971.932 0,2465 437.730 95.836.208 4
2007 22.503.970 0,0969 1.719.906 534.316.933 9
2008 34.298.179 0,2249 4.747.946 770.567.022 9
2009 20.690.392 0,2496 6.822.770 475.091.945 12
2010 11.968.903 0,2612 3.661.224 20.337.657.183 7
2011 37.657.441 0,3382 10.747.355 1.371.807.825 11
2012 5.796.339 0,6691 1.804.052 1.103.962.191 6
2013 69.102.084 0,2387 26.710.725 171.488.009.664 10
Mean 1990-2013 20.459.339 0,5461 6.550.135 14.609.326.723 7.17
Total 1990-2013 470.564.793 - 150.653.100 336.014.514.635 172
 
Source: Own elaboration
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4.2. Stock market reaction and shareholder wealth changes
Table 4 shows the event analysis results. These results consider 172 and 319 events, associated with 
equity  and bond issuances respectively. Corporate bonds and equity issuances generated  significant 
stock price reactions, and therefore relevant shareholder wealth changes. Corporate debt issuances 
caused an abnormal increase of 2.43% on stock prices, which was higher than 0.92% experienced 
in equity issuances. According to previous studies, these results show that information asymmetry 
content is potentially greater in equity issuances (Myers and Majluf, 1984; Mikkelson and Partch, 
1986; Asquith and Mullins, 1986; Masulis and Korwar, 1986; Leal and Amaral, 2000; De Medeiros and 
Matsumoto, 2005). Finally, these results support hypothesis H1.
Changes in shareholder wealth showed similar patterns in both kinds of issuances. The pre-
announcement and post-announcement periods showed positive AARs and CARs. These facts 
materialized mainly during the period prior to issuances (post-announcement). Despite this, equity 
issuances did not significantly affect stock prices during the pre-announcement period. Debt issuances 
generated an accumulated abnormal return of 0.89%. This result is evidence that, in Chile, debt issuances 
are a signaling mechanism that transmits information to the markets prior to FMC authorization.
Table 4. t-tests for market reactions/shareholder wealth, percentage
Stage at analysis 
window
Financing policy event
Debt issue Equity issue
AAR t-statistics CAR t-statistics AAR t-statistics CAR t-statistics
Pre-announcement 0.889 (1.92)* 0.889 (1.84)* 0.360 (0.43) 0.360 (0.74)
Announcement -0.772 (-1.69)* 0.117 (0.94) -0.480 (-0.75) -0.120 (-0.27)
Post- announcement 3.156 (5.42)*** 3.273 (3.85)*** 2.234 (4.27)*** 2.114 (3.77)***
Issuance -0.945 (-1.89)* 2.328 (2.97)*** -0.778 (-1.85)* 1.336 (2.36)**
Post-Issuance 0.102 (1.03) 2.430 (2.67)*** -0.415 (-0.91) 0.921 (1.99)**
 
Superscripts ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively.
Source: Own elaboration.
The AAR and CAR figures were generated mainly in the post-announcement period. This 
also supports the occurrence of significant shareholder wealth changes. CARs on debt and equity 
issuances were 3.27% and 2.11%, respectively. These results are consistent with international empirical 
evidence (Mikkelson and Partch, 1986; Asquith and Mullins, 1986; Masulis and Korwar, 1986; Healy 
and Palepu, 1990; Eckbo and Masulis, 1992; Mitto, 1996; Burton et al., 2000; Welch, 2004; De Medeiros 
and Matsumoto, 2005; Chen and Shehu, 2009; Liu et al., 2016).
The announcement and issuance periods were characterized by negative AARs. During the 
announcement period, debt issuances generated a significant AAR equal to -0.77%, while equity 
issuances generated a non-significant AAR of -0.48%. The fall experienced during the issuance period 
was comparatively greater than that experienced during the announcement period. Both debt and 
equity issuances generated negative and significant AARs equal to -0.94% and -0.77%, respectively. 
These results suggest that downward adjustments in stock prices occurring during the issuance 
period reduce information asymmetry more than those occurring during the announcement period. 
Finally, positive AARs generated between the announcement and the issuance periods support the 
positive CARs for all processes.
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4.3.What factors can explain shareholder wealth changes?
Table 5 presents a statistical analysis of the variables. Chilean firms have high ownership concentration, 
where controlling shareholders own on average 61.64% of company shares. This characteristic is common 
in civil law countries like Chile, where weak legal protections for investor rights motivates controllers 
to concentrate ownership as a way to protect their investments. The fifth-largest shareholders only 
concentrate 3.38%.  Due to the weak legal protections that the Chilean market offers   its investors, it 
is probable that discretionary decisions by controllers could serve to expropriate wealth from these 
shareholders.
Other average results showed that asset turnover for firms was 0.66, while 58.93% of the assets 
corresponded to long-term investments (tangibility). Regarding firm performance, the results indicated 
that the average return on assets was 14.39%, which is consistent with future growth opportunities 
described by Tobin’s Q equal to 7.70.
Table 5. Summary statistics for Chilean firm
Variables Mean S.D.
A. Ownership structure
P1 Controlling-shareholder share (%) 61.64 29.56
P5 Minority-shareholder share (%) 3.38 2.82
B. Leverage and growth opportunities
GOQ Tobin’s Q 7.70 15.09
LEV Leverage (%) 62.73 35.51
C. Others control variables
AC Agency costs 0.66 0.35
FD Financial deficit (billions pesos) 9.2 27.59
SIZE Firm size (billions pesos) 499.78 556.35
ROA Firm profitability (%) 14.39 21.46
TANG Asset tangibility (%) 58.93 74.21
BIS Bonds issue (billions pesos) 17576.84 14857.32
EIS Equity issue (billions pesos) 14609.33 16282.34
SLIQ Stock liquidity (%) 4.02 23.49
 
Source: Own elaboration.
On average, funding requirements amounted to $9.2 billion. In general, the firms financed their 
investments and/or their financial needs mostly through debt. The total debt to total assets ratio 
was 62.73% on average. This could be related to the fact that bond issuances are greater than equity 
issuances.
Tables 6 and 7 present the results of model (6) for corporate debt and equity issuances, respectively. 
In both cases, the Hausman test indicates that the OLS estimator is biased due to an endogeneity 
problem caused by the size of issuance. In all cases, the IV estimator is better than OLS. The Sargan 
test indicates that the models are overidentified and the instruments used are exogenous. 
Table 6 shows that some control variables have the expected effects, mainly in the pre-announcement 
and post-announcement periods. According to Table 6, variables such as firm size (SIZE), returns on 
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assets (ROA), asset tangibility (TANG) and financial deficits (FD) had a positive and significant effect 
on stock price reactions. The results indicate that markets react favorably to debt issuance when 
firms are large, profitable and have investments in long-term assets. Regarding the effect of financial 
deficits (FD), the positive relationship observed suggests that the market associates less information 
asymmetry content to debt issuances (Myers and Majluf, 1984). Bond issue size (BIS) had a significant 
negative effect. Asset turnover ratio, as an agency costs (AC) inverse measure, had a significant and 
negative effect on stock price reactions. When firms have higher agency costs, their stock prices 
react positively because the debt issued is perceived as a control means on agency conflicts (Jensen, 
1986; Ang et al., 2000). Finally, stock liquidity (SLIQ) variables had a positive and significant impact 
on CAR. This result suggests that higher quoted spread (lower stock liquidity) generates a positive 
reaction on stock prices for corporate debt issuances (Lipson and Mortal, 2009).
Ownership structure had a significant effect on stock price reactions. Controlling shareholder 
ownership (P1) had a negative and significant effect, which supports hypothesis H3a. These findings 
suggest that when firms issue debt, the market perceives debt as a substitute means of control in 
relation to the monitoring role of ownership concentration (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Demsetz and 
Lehn, 1985; Jensen, 1986; Chong and López de Silanes, 2007; Céspedes et al., 2010). On the other 
hand, minority shareholder ownership (P5) had a positive but not significant effect on stock price 
reactions. This result contradicts hypothesis H3b. Thus, there is no significant evidence to support the 
hypothesis that stock price reactions can be explained by the complementary relationship between 
debt issued and minority shareholder ownership.




Dependent variable: Stock price reaction/shareholder wealth changes measured by CAR






0.0112 0.0551*** 0.0055 0.0791*** 0.0632** 0.1119***




-0.0104*** 0.0003 -0.0244*** -0.0083*** 0.0095*** -0.0322***
(-3.09) (0.91) (-3.39) (-2.92) (3.13) (-2.64)
Minority-
shareholder
0.0060** 0.0007 0.0108** -0.0142*** 0.0051 0.0010
(2.04) (0.66) (2.47) (-3.18) (0.89) (0.45)
 Leverage and growth opportunities
Tobin’s Q
0.0084*** -0.0007 0.0110*** -0.0023** 0.0072*** 0.0238***
(3.49) (-0.29) (3.06) (-2.01) (3.19) (3.41)
Tobin’s Q 
squared
-0.0006*** -0.0001 -0.0009*** -0.0002 -0.0006** -0.0023***
(-2.67) (-0.51) (-3.15) (-0.74) (-2.51) (-2.89)
Leverage
0.0248*** 0.0019 0.0181*** -0.0104** 0.0132*** 0.0441***
(3.11) (1.08) (3.45) (-1.98) (2.73) (2.99)
Leverage 
squared
-0.0021*** 0.0001 -0.0019** 0.0007 -0.0022** -0.0051***
(-2.91) (0.45) (-2.56) (0.99) (-2.49) (-2.77)
Other control variables
Agency costs
-0.0223** 0.0052 -0.0321** 0.0023 -0.0211** -0.0465**
(-1.97) (0.88) (-2.53) (0.54) (-2.03) (-2.48)
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Explanatory 
variables
Dependent variable: Stock price reaction/shareholder wealth changes measured by CAR






0.0191** -0.0084 0.0283*** -0.0052 0.0162* 0.0458***
(2.16) (-0.93) (3.11) (-0.28) (1.79) (2.61)
Firm size
0.0053** -0.0011 0.0047* 0.0024 0.0013 0.0072**
(2.10) (-0.59) (1.71) (1.27) (0.82) (1.98)
Firm 
profitability
0.0004 -0.0013 0.0302** 0.0011 0.0113* 0.0195**
(0.33) (-0.65) (2.51) (1.03) (1.69) (2.29)
Asset tangibility
0.0169** -0.0022 0.0227** 0.0010 0.0056 0.0376**
(2.31) (-0.47) (2.44) (0.26) (0.49) (2.21)
Issue size
-0.0058 -0.0889*** 0.0121 0.0033 0.0017 -0.0357**
(-0.95) (-3.14) (1.14) (0.51) (0.36) (-2.03)
Stock liquidity 
0.0357*** 0.0028 0.0211*** 0.0039 0.0015 0.0392***
(3.18) (1.12) (2.75) (1.03) (0.89) (2.67)
Adjusted 
R-squared 0.39 0.21 0.43 0.31 0.29 0.41
Global F-test (51.21)*** (48.57)*** (60.58)*** (46.19)*** (55.10)*** (49.35)***
White test (21.42)*** (26.02)*** (19.49)*** (27.36)*** (20.35)*** (16.98)***
Hausman test (28.39)*** (35.23)*** (38.01)*** (30.22)*** (37.75)*** (32.06)***
Sargan test (46.01) (40.93) (37.56) (39.61) (41.35) (36.19)
Sector dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Stage dummy No No No No No Yes
Robust 
variance Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 319 319 319 319 319 1595
 
Superscripts ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively.
Source: Own elaboration.
According to previous studies, growth opportunities (GO) had a positive and significant effect on 
stock price reactions (Myers and Majluf, 1984; Ambarish et al., 1987; Dierkens, 1991; Pilotte, 1992; Denis, 
1994; Burton et al., 2000; Quynh-Nhu, 2009). This suggests that the growth opportunities of Chilean 
firms offer high return that offsets information asymmetry costs. In addition, growth opportunities 
have a non-linear effect, which supports hypothesis H4 for debt issuances. Thus, when firms’ bond 
issuers have considerable growth opportunities, stock price reactions become negative because 
the stock market perceives that growth opportunities are overvalued and have high information 
asymmetry content (Smith and Watts, 1992; Gombola et al., 1998).
Capital structure (LEV) had a positive and significant effect on stock price reactions, and therefore 
on shareholder wealth changes. Such an impact reveals that the stock market considers marginal 
debt as a control means on agency conflicts (Cai and Zhang, 2011). In addition, corporate debt has a 
non-linear effect on stock price reactions. This supports hypothesis H5. Therefore, when firms issue 
bonds, the initial positive effect on stock price reactions is reversed. This second effect is observable 
in firms with high leverage. For this reason, the market perceives that additional debt increases 
bankruptcy risk and debt agency costs.
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Table 7 shows the model (6) results for stock price reactions during equity issuances. Variables 
such as firm size, firm profitability, asset tangibility and issuance size had similar effects to those 
described in Table 6. The asset turnover ratio showed a significant and positive effect. This suggests 
that higher agency costs have  a negative effect on stock price because  capital diffusion is attributed 
to higher agency conflicts. The financial deficit variable had a significant and negative effect, which 
indicates that capital issuances have higher information asymmetry. Finally, the stock liquidity (SLIQ) 
variable had a negative and significant impact on CAR. This result suggests that a higher quoted 
spread (lower stock liquidity) generates a negative reaction in stock prices for equity issuance (Lipson 
and Mortal, 2009).




Dependent variable: Stock price reaction/shareholder wealth changes measured by CAR






0.0107 0.0321*** 0.0006 0.0622*** 0.0712*** 0.0952***




0.0127*** 0.0002 0.0219*** -0.0029 0.0113** 0.0246***
(3.26) (0.58) (3.69) (-1.60) (1.97) (3.13)
Minority-
shareholder
-0.0094** -0.0001 -0.0157*** 0.0033 0.0048 -0.0135***
(-2.08) (-0.31) (-3.15) (1.29) (1.38) (-2.79)
Leverage and growth opportunities
Tobin’s Q
0.0111*** -0.0010 0.0156*** 0.0077** 0.0025 0.0127***
(3.14) (-0.52) (3.69) (1.99) (0.83) (4.24)
Tobin’s Q 
squared
-0.0009** -0.0003 -0.0012*** -0.0007** -0.0003 -0.0012***
(-2.47) (-1.51) (-3.29) (-2.23) (-0.86) (-3.34)
Leverage
-0.0212*** 0.0007 -0.0213*** -0.0098** -0.0029 -0.0197***
(-3.21) (0.43) (-3.14) (-1.99) (-1.01) (-3.71)
Leverage 
squared
0.0020* 0.0003 0.0019** 0.0006 -0.0013 0.0028**
(1.95) (0.24) (2.33) (0.57) (1.12) (2.11)
Other control variables
Agency costs
0.0353*** 0.0002 0.0429*** 0.0001 0.0017 0.0459***
(3.59) (0.22) (4.47) (0.26) (1.36) (4.66)
Financial 
deficit
-0.0135*** -0.0029 -0.0184*** -0.0106** 0.0013 -0.0198***
(-3.28) (-0.72) (-2.83) (-2.11) (0.64) (-2.91)
Firm size
0.0008 0.0064 0.0005 0.0003 0.0009 0.0017
(1.05) (1.37) (0.39) (0.55) (0.81) (0.62)
Firm 
profitability
0.0125 0.0019 0.0505** 0.0102 0.0017 0.0311**
(0.69) (0.31) (2.47) (0.75) (0.27) (2.55)
Asset 
tangibility
0.0296*** 0.0024 0.0159 0.0054 0.0081 0.0247*
(3.48) (0.43) (1.18) (0.86) (1.03) (1.86)
Issue size
-0.0127** 0.0011 -0.0245*** 0.0051 0.0055 -0.0201***
(-2.15) (0.68) (-2.74) (0.54) (0.91) (-3.02)
Stock liquidity
-0.0496*** -0.0098 -0.0291*** -0.0163 -0.0116 -0.0417***
(-3.21) (-0.73) (-2.77) (-1.48) (-1.09) (-3.36)
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Explanatory 
variables
Dependent variable: Stock price reaction/shareholder wealth changes measured by CAR






R-squared 0.49 0.33 0.47 0.37 0.35 0.51
Global F-test (55.26)*** (48.94)*** (60.13)*** (49.15)*** (40.24)*** (56.37)***
White test (29.47)*** (32.58)*** (27.04)*** (35.29)*** (30.18)*** (28.16)***
Hausman test (23.90)*** (29.02)*** (27.46)*** (33.07)*** (29.62)*** (25.08)***
Sargan test (39.27) (42.51) (50.73) (44.95) (41.34) (40.04)
Sector dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Stage dummy No No No No No Yes
Robust 
variance Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 172 172 172 172 172 860
 
Superscripts ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively.
Source: Own elaboration.
Ownership structure effects were statistically significant. Controlling shareholder ownership (P1) 
had a positive effect on stock price reactions when firms issue equity, while minority shareholder 
ownership (P5) had a negative effect. These results support hypotheses H2a and H2b respectively. 
The positive effect of controlling-shareholder ownership suggests that the market associates equity 
issuance with an increasing probability that current controllers will acquire the stocks issued. This 
implies improved corporate performance and decreased risk (Armitage, 2002; Barnes and Walker, 
2006). In addition, the negative effect of minority shareholder ownership is a reflection of wealth 
expropriation opportunities (Liu et al., 2016).
Growth opportunities had a positive and non-linear effect on stock price reactions, which supports 
hypothesis H4. As in bond issuances, growth opportunities had an effect that offset information 
asymmetry costs. However, greater growth opportunities contain a higher degree of information 
asymmetry, which can lead to the overvaluation of a firm.
Finally, corporate  debt also had significant effects on stock price reactions. The negative impact of 
this variable indicates that equity issuances have greater information asymmetry than other financing 
sources. However, debt’s non-linear effect suggests that when the firm’s financial leverage is high, 
equity issuances have a positive impact on stock price reactions because additional equity mitigates 
bankruptcy risks and debt agency costs. This corroborates hypothesis H5.
5. Conclusions and discussion
The analysis of capital structure in Latin American (and particularly Chilean) firms has become 
more relevant in recent years. Capital structure changes, whether due to debt or equity issuances, 
can lead to significant changes in stock prices, and therefore redistribute shareholder wealth. An 
extensive literature review reveals that when firms issue debt or equity, stock prices experience 
positive abnormal returns mainly during the pre-announcement and post-announcement periods. 
This stock price reaction is sufficient to compensate for the negative abnormal returns that occur 
during the announcement and issuance periods.
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In Chile, few studies have been conducted in this field, and those that have been conducted generally 
endorse the results described by international evidence. This paper contributes to empirical evidence 
for emerging markets, and especially for the Chilean market, in two respects. First, we conclude 
that capital structure changes generate a significant stock price reaction. Our research indicates 
that debt issuances generated 2.43% abnormal returns and equity issuances generated 0.92%. In 
contrast to previous studies, which have tended to state that this reaction is generated during the 
pre-announcement period, our results show that this positive stock price reaction is more significant 
during the period preceding issuance. According to regulations established by the FMC, our results 
also show that the information transmitted by firms prior to capital structure changes does not 
generate significant changes in stock price. Only debt issuances generated a 0.89% abnormal return 
during the pre-announcement period. This indicates that debt issuances are a signaling means for the 
stock market. This first result is relevant for firms, investors and policymakers. For firms this result 
implies that capital structure changes can generate shareholder wealth changes, while for investors 
this result may contribute to the improvement of investment decision-making. For policymakers 
this result provides them with a guide to design financial policies aimed atimproving the securities 
issuance processes.
Some studies have indicated that stock price reactions depend on firms’ specific characteristics, 
but there is little clear consensus on this point. As a secondary contribution of this article, our results 
show that stock price reactions are affected by firms’ ownership structure, growth opportunities and 
leverage. Controlling-shareholder ownership negatively affects stock price reactions when debt is 
issued, but positively affects them when equity is issued. These results indicate that, for companies 
with concentrated ownership, the market perceives debt issuances as a substitute means of control in 
relation to controllers’ monitoring role. The positive reaction observed during equity issuances shows 
that the market associates ownership concentration by controlling shareholders with greater control 
and corporate performance. On the other hand, minority-shareholder ownership had a negative and 
significant effect on stock price reactions. This impact was only observed during equity issuances. 
This indicates that equity dilution is associated with greater agency conflicts between non-controlling 
and controlling shareholders. Therefore, this last result also illustrates that equity issuances are a 
means of wealth expropriation because a reduction in minority-shareholder ownership had a positive 
effect on market reaction. These results are relevant for firms because they reveal that the market 
interprets their ownership structure in a differentiated  way. In addition, this is particularly relevant 
for Chile due its  weak legal protections for investors’ rights.
Growth opportunities also had significant effects on stock price reactions during issuance 
processes. Future growth opportunities of issuing firms had a positive and non-linear effect on 
shareholder wealth changes. According to Myers and Majluf (1984), this reaction implies that growth 
opportunities are positively valued by markets and offset information asymmetry costs. Nonetheless, 
the non-linear relationship (inverted-U) suggests that, when firms have greater growth opportunities, 
the market associates capital structure changes with the overvaluation of these opportunities, and 
therefore with higher information asymmetry in issued securities.
The effects of debt on shareholder wealth changes vary according to the kind of issuance. Debt 
had a positive effect on stock price reactions when firms issued corporate bonds, while it had a 
negative effect when firms issued equity. Our results show that the market assesses the financial 
risks of issuances. Thus, the market interprets marginal debt as a means of external control capable of 
increasing firm performance and mitigating agency costs. In any case, the non-linear effects of debt 
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show that when debt is high, previous impacts are reversed. For the market, additional debt increases 
the firm’s risk, while equity issuances would constitute a control that reduces this risk. These results 
are relevant for investors because they may help to guide their investment decisions. The findings 
may also be of use to firms, helping them to infer the market reaction to securities issuance processes 
according to their specific characteristics, such as growth opportunities and leverage.
Future studies should analyze the effects of the adoption of the OECD corporate governance 
practices on stock price reaction, and their role in  controlling wealth expropriation.
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